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Credit rationing has recently been explaíned as an equilibrius pheno~enon under
asymnetric information. It is, however. a very costly resolution of
informatíonal problems. Thus. 1t is natural to expect credit ~echanisms to
arise that lessen the incidence of rationing. L'sing a dynanic sodel of credit
market equilibrium under asynmetric information, this paper explaíns how
intertemporal credit contracting can eliminate the rationing which arises
endogenously with spot contracting. This eay explain why billions of dollars
in credit commitments are annua]]y issued by commercial banks: these
commitAents provide borrowers with guaranteed future funds availability and
hence insure them against rationing. ]t is also indicated how a perturbation
of the sodel leads to the persistence of credit rationing despite long-term
credit commitments. even though its incidence is reduced by such commitments.
The analysis also produces additional predictions.DY~AMIC EQCILIBRICM I~ A COMPETITIVE CREDIT MARKET: INTERTEMPORAL CO~TRACTI~G
AS INSURA~CE AGAIKST RATIONING
I. I~TRODliCTIO[:
The purpose of this paper is to examine intertempora] contracting issues
in an informationally constrained, competitive credit market in which borrowers
have access to collateral. Specifically, our principa] goals are twofold. The
first is to characterize and prove the exístence of a cowpetitive equilibrium
in a two-period, universally risk neutra] credit market in which the contract
choices and repayment behavior of privately informed borrowers convey
i:~formntion to banks through iime, and banks can ration credit in any period.
The second. more important, goal is to show that the possibility of rationing
makes it advantageous for borrowers to purchase commitments from banks that
guarantee the future availability of credit at predetermined terms. Thus. even
risk neutral borrowers demand "insurance" against future credit rationing.
This research is inspired by two distinct strands of the financial
intermediation literature. One is the credit rationing literature, and the
other is the literature on credit options, commonly known as "bank loan
commitments."
Although the literature on credit rationing is extensive (see, for
example, Jaffee and Modiglianí 11969). Jaffee and Russell 11976), and
particularly the survey by Baltensperger (1978)), it's only recently that there
have emerged explanations for ratloning as an equilibrium phenomenon resulting
from profit-maximizíng behavior by competitive banks. The semina]
contributions of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981. 1983) have shown that informational
constraints can lead banks to ratSon credit either in a single period eodel or2
in a two period model in which poor fírst period perfor~aance is followed by
credit denia] being used as an ex post efficient incentive mechanism.l Besanko
and Thakor (1987) have de~onstrated that credít rationing can occur In a single
period ~odel even when collateral is available, as long as ít is constrained.2
The starting point of our analysis are the Stiglítz and Weiss ( S-W) and Besanko
and Thakor (B-T) papers. As in S-W (1981) and B-T (1987), we construct a mode]
in which static contracting leads to equilibriu~ rationíng by coapetitive
banks. l;nlike S-W 11983), however, dynamic contracting elieinates rationing.
This is an iaportant dístinction because the focal point of this paper is the
argument that the widespread occurrence of credit cowmitwents and other similar
long terA arrangenents between banks and borrowers can be rationalized as
"insurance" against credit rationing. Moreover, another distinction between
S-W (1983) and our paper is that, unlike S-W (1983), the rationíng here is not
an ex post "disciplining" device.
Currently, billions of dollars are loaned annually by C.S. banks under
bank ]oan co~nmitments. A]though there is now a voluminous literature on loan
commitnents3. there does not seem to be a well accepted explanation for why
these instruments exist ín the first place. Basically. a loan comsitment
is a contract that guarantees the future availability of credit at an interest
rate that is elther fixed or a deterAínistíc function of some index rate.q
The contract has been interpreted as a put option5 that enables the borrower
to acquire credit at a below-~arket interest rate. However, this view
i~plies that borrowers are purchasíng ínsurance against future random
borrowing rates. It is, therefore, Sncapable of explaining why the bulk of
loan commitment denand stens from corporatíons owned by diversified
shareholders, i.e., rísk neutral customers. The "practítioner's" view of loan3
commitments. on the other hand. seems to be that these are arrangements
primar]ly intended to assure borrowers of ready avai]ability of credit in
future time periods. To date. however, there i s no formal analysís that
explains loan commitment demand on these grounds.s It i s our objective to lend
rigor to this intuition. we do this by showing that i ntertemporal contracting
-- of the type í nherent i n loan commitments -- can aid in minimizing the
allocational distortions arising from rationing in (future) spot markets. The
intertrmpora] contracts we derive are rather comp]ex. The contracts specify
the current loan terms ( first period contract termsl in conjunction with the
terms of future credit-delivery Isecund period contract ternsl. The terms of
future delivery are conditioned on first period realizations -- that is.
contracts hece a " memory" feature in th~ sensr of Rugerson ( 1985) -- and are
bindino for the bank.~ But thP borrower alwa~~s has the option to "wa]k away"
from the contract and take a spot market contract in the second period. lI: is
for this reasun ttiat we dn not examine " two-way" binding contractsl. Khile
this intertemporal credit contract has a striking resemblance to real wocld
]oan commitment contracts, it is difficult to determine the extent tu which uur
theoretically optimal pricing structure corresponds to the pricing structure
found in ]oan commitments Isee Nelnick and Piaut ( 1986)). For this reason. we
shall refer to our contracts as "intertemporal credit contracts" rather than
loan commitments.8
The task of showing that intertemporal credit contracting is motivated by
borrowers' desire to acquíre protection against future ratloning is ~ade
delicate Dy the following observation. If equilibrium credit rationing is
indeed possíble in a given set of circumstances, then it must be true that it
is lex ante) efficient for the Icompetitive) bank to deny credit in those~
circumstances. Why. then. is it ever an equilíbrlum phenomenon for the same
bank to agree to an intertemporal contract that prevents 1t from rationing
credit in the same set of circumstances? Any model desígned to address this
issue must be careful to resolve this apparent paradox.
Our approach is related to papers by Harrís and Holmstrom (19821. Cooper
and Hayes (1982), and Palfrey and Spatt (1985), all of which examíne
intertemporal contracting issues. Harris and Holmstrom (1982) analyze dynamic
contracting in a]abor earket with risk averse workers. Their contracting
environment is similar to our intertemporal contracts in that long-term
commitments made by firms (banks) to workers (borrowers) are assumed to be
honored. but commitments by workers to firms are not. However, there are two
key differences. First, workers in their mode] are risk averse: we have
universal risk neutrality. Second. they have symmetric information, while
asymmetric information is at the heart of our analysis. 7his also
distinguishes our paper from Palfrey and Spatt's (1985) which assumes that the
insurer and the risk averse insured are symmetrically informed. Moreover.
Palfrey and Spatt (19851 assume that commitments are either honored by both
parties or by none. Finally, Cooper and Hayes (1982) allow for asymmetric
information but assume the insured are risk averse. Moreover, their
contracting regime and equilibrium analysis differ substantially from ours.
It !s striking that we obtain the result that íntertemporal contractine is
welfare-improving despite the universal risk neutrality assumption. Previous
research has been able to es[ablish a benefit for intertemporal contracting
only with risk aversion.
Our mode] -- which is an augmented and dynamic version of the B-T (19871
model -- can briefly be described as foilows. There is a large credit market5
with many banks and borrowers. All agents are risk neutral and the market is
perfectly competitive. Each borrower invests in each period ín a single period
project whose payoff distrlbution is known only to the borrower. The ínputs in
both períods are investments which are funded by bank loans. A borrower's
project payoffs are positively correlated over tíme, which implies that a bank
learns something about the borrower's type by observing realized (past)
returns. However, observing returns never completely resolves the
informational asymmetry since a realized return is only a noisy signal of a
borrower's type.9 A priori uninformed banks attempt to sort borrowers by
offering contracts that specífy. for each period. the (i) credít granting
probabi]ity, lii) ]oan interest factor. and (iii) collateral requirement. Two
types of contracting structures are studied. Both structures are dynan.ic in
:het they inc:orporate intertemporal linkages -- second period contracts depend
on first period contract choices and repayment behavlor. The fírst structure.
however, only permits what we cal] "single period" contracts. With these
contracts, the bank is constrained to break even in each period. The second
structure permits what we call "intertemporal" contracts, which allow for the
possibility of interten~poral subsidies to borrowers. Thus, the bank is only
constrained to break even across the two periods. With single period
contracting, the problem reduces to one in which there are two successive spot
credit markets. In this setting we obtain an equilibrium in which credit is
rationed ín the aecond period following first period default. With
intertempora] contracting, however, it is shown that equilibrium credit
rationing can be elininated. The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
In Section II, we descríbe the model and state the main assumptions. Section
III contains a definition of the equilibrium, a formal statement of thes
constrained optiwization prograw that leads to the equilibrium. and the
equilibriuw solution to the single perlod contracting problew. In Section IV
we present the equilibriuw solution to the lntertewporal contracting problew.
Section V has a cowparison of the single perlod and intertewporal contracting
equilibria. Section VI takes up the íssue of exístence ot equilibriuw and
contains a theorew that estaDlishes the existence of a unique equilibriuw.
Section VII discusses a perturbation of the wodel that would lead to the
persistence of rationing even with long-terw comwitwents, although such
cowwitwents would reduce its incidence. Ewpirical Iwplications of the analysis
are a]so drawn out. Fina]]y. Section VIII concludes. Al] forwa] proofs are
contained in the Appendix.
II. THE MODEL
A. Preferences and Market Structure:
All agents are risk neutral. The credit warket is perfectly competitive
and banks cowpete for both deposits and loans. Deposi[s are in perfectly
elastic supply at a cowmonly known warket deterwined interest rate. The
economy lives for two periods. The first period begins at t-0 and ends at t-1
and the second begins at t-] and ends at t-2. Taken together. these
assumptions are weant to iwply that: (1) the bank's depositors receive tn each
period an expected return equal to the single period riskless interest rate,
(ii) the bank earns zero expected profit, and (111) the expected utilíty of
each borrower ís waxiwized subject to the relevant inforwational and breakeven
constraints. The single period riskless interest factor (one plus the riskless
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Fixure 1- 1Te borrorers' trnes and returns in the tro oeriod credit aarket.B. Technology:
Each potential borrower can invest 5] each period in a point-input.
point-output project. Outputs are only available for periods in which
invest~eents are sade. The output each period is an end-of-period return which
is R(a positive. real valued scalar) íf the project Is successful and zero
otherwise. R is the same for all borrowers as well as for both time periods,
and is common knowledge. However, the probability of success varies across
borrowers in any gi~~en time period and across time periods for any given
borrower. In any time period. there are two types of borrowers, "good" (gl and
"bad" (b). A borrower's type in period j E{].2y is denoted by Kje{g,b~. Goad
borrowers have a success probability of óH. and bad borrowers have a success
probability of 6L. fíe let 0 ~ óL ~ 6H ~ 1. Pruject returns are pusitively
correlated through time. That is, a borrower starts out at t-0 being of a
certain type, and then its type in the second period is probabilistically
determined by its first period type and the realized return of íts first period
project. These conditiona] transition probabilities are t'~, v, p and a. which
are defined in FiQUre 1. This figure also pictorially depicts the tempora:
evolution ut burrower types. In order to ensure intertemporally positively
correlated project returns, we assume v~ ~1 and a~ fc.l~
C. Endowments:
All potential borrowers have existing endowments of liquidity which are
totally lnvested in other projects. It ís ínefficient for any borrower to
prematurely liquidate its "other" project in order to finance the new I51 point
input, point outputl investment project in any period. Hence. all borrowers
must finance their new investments with bank loans. Although not optimal to
prematurely líquidate, a borrower's exísting ínvestment can be offered as8
collateral to secure the loan for the new investment. For simplicity. each
borrower is assumed to start at t-0 with e common7y known end-of-period value
of Wp for its existing investment, i.e., WQ is constant across borrowers.
Hence, the maximum collateral a borrower can offer at tr0 is W0. Collateral is
not augmented through time. but it may be lost. We assume that the first
period return from a borrower's existing investwent as well ns the return from
the first period project financed with a bank loan are unavailable for
financing the second pPriod project. Thus, a borrower must enter the credit
market again at t-1 to acquire a loan for its second period project.~I
D. Information Structure:
The bank knows the cross-sectiona] distribution of borrowers' success
probabilities at t-0 as well as the conditional transition probabilities that
guide the temporal evolution of each borrower's type. Moreover. the bank
observes all realized returns. However. the bank does not know any individual
borrower's success probability at t-0. That is, at t-0 the bank knows that a
fraction Y of the countable infinity of borrowers in the market are bad and a
fraction 1-Y are good.12 but is unab]e to distinguish borrowers by type.
Except in some special cases, the bank suffers from a similar informational
handicap at t-1.
E. Feasible Contract Space:
The bank will attempt to cope with this pre-contract informational
asymmetry by designing a menu of credit contracts at t-0 that induce borrowers
to truthfully reveal their success probabilities to the bank in a manner
consonant with the revelatíon principle.13 It is convenient to think of a
dynawic strategic credit policy as a vector, B-(gil. Ys2 (Yi,XI)) where BiI is
the first period credit policy and BZIY~.X11 is the second period credit policy9
a~ailable to a borrower whose first period choice of contract fro~ policy
B1
was yl and whose realized first period project return was X1- yote that 7(1 ís
a rando~ variable with state epace {O,R). Víewing inltial stra[eglc credit
policies this way allows us to capture the dynaeic structure of the credit
~arket with a si~ple representation. Thís should not be taken to i~ply that
borrowers bind theeselves to long tere contracts. A borrower that chooses
ylE B1 at i~0 ~ight very well decide at t-1 that it does not wish to take any
contract from `EZ(y1.7(~) because some other bank in the spot credit sarket ai
t-1 offers it more favorable credit teras. It should only be taken to Aean
that a bank offering B1 at t-0 is willing to offer the same borrower `ji2(yi.~(1)
at t-1.
A credit contract for a given period is defined to consist of: ~i) n,
the probability with which credit will be granted. (ii) a, the ]oan interest
factor (one plus the ]oan interest rate) if credit is granted, and liii) C, the
amount of collateral requíred. where C E[O.Kp].
The policy ~sl consists of a pair of credit contracts, one for each type
at tz0, whereas the policy BZ(y1.X1) consísts of eight credit contracts, a pair
for each initial choice y~E B1 and for each possible value of X1. At t-0, the
borrower can be viewed as aelecting one contract fron B1. Then, at t-l, it
will observe its project return (as will the bank) and select a contract frop
the pair in BZIyi.Xl) that corresponds to its specific (y1,X1) combination.
We permit a disparity in the valuation of collateral by the borrower and
the bank by defining the bank's valuation as ~C, with g E[0,1).14 Further,
any interaction between a borrower and a bank í~sediately beco~es co~son
knowledge. Thus, any possible inforn~ation accumulation gain fron an enduring
bank-borrower relatíonship is ruled out. Finally, as a~atter of convenience.]0
all borrowers' reservation utility constraints are assumed to be slack at the
optíwuw, i.e., equilibrium credit contracts are such that the net surplus
accruing to any borrower frow any of i ts projects i s nonnegative.
III. EQUILIBRIIIM CO~CEPT A1vD THE OPTIMI2AT10N PROGRAM
A. EQUilíbriua Concept:
In our wodel. the (uninformedl bank posts a menu of credit contracts and
then each borrower responds by selecting its most favored contract. Thus. we
have a lmultiperiod) gawe in which the uninformed agent moves first.l~ To
characterize equilibrium we adopt a wodified, dynamic version of Riley's (]979)
reactive equilibriuw.ló
Let `-{],---,n} denote the set of a]] possible (competing) Danks Ithe
counting weasure of R could be infinityl and let fi(~1 --- ~nl be the (netl
expected profit of bank 1 when the vector of strategic credit policies being
offered by a]] banks at t-0 is 1~].---.Bn). Here we take ~1-1~~,~zly].X]i)
as the strategic credit policy of bank i E K. A bank's (netl expected profit
is the aggregate revenue from its loans over the two periods minus its pa~~off
to depositors over those two periods. For later use. we define a feasible spot
credit contract to be simply a single period credit contract available to the
borrower in the spot credít warket at either ts0 or t:l such that the offering
bank earns nonnegative expected profit on its single period ]oan to the
borrower type for which the contract was designed. We assume spot credtt
contracts are availeble in both time periods.
Definition of Feasíble Policies: A dynamic strategic credit policy ~i of bank
i is feasibie if
li) it produces nonnegative expected profits for the offering bank. and
(ii) it contains only those credit contracis that are at least as attraciive1]
for the borrowers as the correspondíng feasible spot credit contracts at
t-o and t-1.
This definition of feasibility rules out ínterte~poral contracts that can
be "broken" by spot credit contracts at any point in ti~e, i.e., it precludes
interte~poral contracts under whlch 1) the borrower at t~0 prefers an available
(feasible) spot credit contract to a~ yl E B1, knoMinA that its choice of the
spot contract wíll preclude choosing any ele~ent of BZ(yl,Xl) at t-1, or 2) the
borrower at L-1 prefers an avaílable (feasíble) spot credit contract to an
contract in BZ(y1,X11. given its (Y1.X1) realization. This i~plies that nu
spot credit contract can extst in any period that lures a borrower away from
tne contract choices offered by the bank under its dynamic credit policy. Ke
can now define equilibrium.
Definition of Egui]ibrium. A dynamic reactivP equilibrium (DRE) ís a set of
feasible strategic credit policies. ~ r(B1,---,Bnl, for the n banks if:
(a) for any i E h and any feasible strategic policy B1 such that
ii(B1.---,Bí.---.Bnl ~ 1'il~)
3 another creditor J E K and another feasible strategic polícy BJ such that
li) ~J(B1.---.Bí.---Bn) ~ fJl~)
(ii) fJ(B1.---.81.---.BJ.---,Bn) ~ fJ(81.---,Bi.---,BJ,---.Bnl
(iii) ~ilBl.---.81.---.BJ.---.Bn) ~ ~i(~)
(iv) v e E ~, m i i, J and al] feasible Bm
fJlBl.---.Bí.---.BJ.---.8~,---,Bnl
7 iml mi mJ a~ mn~-
(b) 3 no Bí E~ such that its feasibilíty requires that the bank and the
borrower be restricted froe renegotiating theír credit contract when it is
- r' J
nutually beneficia] for them to do so.Iz
By inposing condition DI, we ensure that the equi]ibrium concept does not
artificially force the bank and the borrower to agree ex ante to long-term
strategies that neither eay wish to pursue aubsequently. It thus rules out
froo the equilibriuA set those intertesporal contracts which give both the
borrower and the bank an incentive to renegotiate the contract terms at a
future point in ti~e.~7
It is convenient to think of a borrower reportíng its first period type.
K~E{H,L), to a bank i at t-0. It wi]] receive a first pPriod contract
y~ IKI) E Bi from the bank that is contingent upon its report. Then. at t-]
this borrower will observe its first period payoff realization. XI E{O.R}, and
report its second period type. KZ E{FI.L}, to bank i. Let
i y2(KI,XI.K21 E~ZIy1.X1) be the second period credit contract awarded to this
borrower. Define ~~IK1.X1.K21 - y~IKl) U y21K1.X1.K2) E~i. For notationa]
ease, let z-(K~.X~.KZ)EiIi.L}x{O.R}xf}{,I,} denote the "composite ty~F" of the
borrower in the second period. From Figure 1 we can see that there are eight
possible values of z. Following Ri]ey (]979) we noM define the credit po:icy
of bank i as being dynamically stronply in-formationally consistent (DSI`CI if
it is feasible and has the following properties:
(i) Y1(K1) ~ K Y1(K1) v K1.K1E{H.L}
~ I
I11) YZ(K1.X1.K2) ~ KZy21K1.X1.KZ1 V K2.KZE(H,L}
(iii) ;i(~Olz).z) - 0 v z E {H,L}x{O,R}x{H,L}
(iv) it is subgame perfect.
where ~ K denotes the preference ordering of a type - K~ borrower Ij-1.2) and ~ j
' 1
ii(b~lz),z) is the expected profit of bank i on the two-period contract
sequence B~Iz) when such a contract sequence is taken by a borrower of
"composite type" z. We now have the following adaptation of one of Riley's
(1979) principal results.13
THEOREM 1: The DRE credit policy for a Qiven bank is the Pareto dominant
~enber of the fawily of DSIyC credit policies.
B. Sose Prelísinary Resarks About the Nature of Sortine:
The sotivation for the Dank to choose credit instrunents in addition to
the loan interest rate co~es fro~ the fact that (first bestl contracts which
specify only a different loan ínterest ratP for each borrower type are not
íncentive compatible. The only possible outcone in this case is pooling.
However, a pooling allocation that involves all borrowers being charged the
same interest rate is ínherently susceptible to the introduction of more
complex credit contracts that entice only the initia]]y good borrowers away
from the pooling allocation. One such complexity is a secured loan, i.e., the
loan contract specifies a collatera] reyuirement along with an interest rate.
A competitive bank can now offer two contracts. One contract demands some
collatera] but a]ow interest rate, whereas the other contract involves no
collateral but has a high interest rate. As Bester (1985) and B-T (19871 sho~.
this induces an incentive compatible sorting of borrowers. Good borrowers
choose the secured loan contract with a low interest rate. and bad borrowers
choose the unsecured loan with a high interest rate. This is not a first best
outcoAe because collateral involves deadweight losses due to the bank's
evaluation of it being lower than the borrower's. Now, if the two borrower
types are sufficíently disparate, the íncentive co~patible level of collateral
in the secured loan contract will exceed the borrower's available collatera]-
eligible assets (B-T 11987)). This frustrates sorting. However, incentive
coepatibility can be restored by setting the credit granting probability on the
secured loan contract to be nonzero but less than one. Thus, the equilibrium]4
involves the good borrowers being asked to put up collateral and be sometimes
rationed, and the bad borrowers receiving unsecured, high ínterest rate loans
with probability (w.p.) one. This allocatlon is even ~ore distortionary
because rationing is a very costly sorting device in that positive net present
value investments are foresaken. All of these preliminaries are proved
rigorously in B-T (1987) and are also stated formally for completeness in what
follows. The discussion here is íntended to motivate our modeling approach.
We will assume throughout that the initial level of collateral-eligible
wealth, w~. is such that the col]atera] constraint is never binding at t-0.
But íf the collateral is lost by a borrower who selected a secured contract in
the first period (due to failure of the projectl. the collateral remaining for
the second period, W, is less than the level needed for an "optimally" (no
rationingJ coi]ateralized Isepnrating) contract. This is the sensP in whicti
collateral is assumed to be constrained. Since in the second period, we ha~~e
just a single period game, the~ B T(]987) second period results apply. Thus.
we have a case in which rationing is encountered in the second period. Figure
1 reveals that thr constraint on W~ leads to rationing of good borrowers in thr.
set of nodes III (to see this, note ttiat orily the contracts for good borrowers
involve coliateral and, therefore, collateral has been lost only in the set of
nodes III). So, we shou)d expect rationing of good borrowers in the set of
nodes III. IFormal proofs wiJl be presented in subsequent sections.) The
major analysis Is aimed at proving that intertesporal contracting -- which
allows for subsidizing across time periods -- could obviate the need for
rationing and ímprove borrower welfare.
Our collateral constraint can be thought of as follows. Suppose we are
in the second period in an information set such that the bank does not know the]5
borrower's second period type but knows that the borrower failed in the first
period. Let the borrower have collateral-eligibJe assets of W and assume W is
lnsufficient to elimtnate aecond period rationíng. Gíven W and the
endogenously deterwined second period rationing probability, suppose an
endogenously determined collateral of C is needed wlth a secured loan 1n the
first perlod to ensure that the borrower taking the secured loan is not
rationed at t-0. Then our assumption 1s that CtW ~ W~. Of course, since
collateral levels in both periods are endogenously determined. we will need to
show that reducing C and augmenting second period collatera] availability is
not optimal, i.e., it is not optimal to reduce second period rationing in
exchange for some first period rationing.
As mentioned earlier, one can substitute. without loss of generallty. r~-0
and a-1. This implies that a borrower which is good at t-0 and is successful
during the first period is good w.p, one in the second period. whereas a bad
borrower which is unsuccessful in the first period is bad w.p. one in the
second period. This does not sacrifice generality because in the set of nodes
II and V, where these substitutions apply, the collateral constraint is never
binding. Thus, these nodes can be simplified without affecting the saín
result.
As mentioned earlier, our assumption that the collateral constraint is
not bindíng at t-0 does not preclude first period rationing since collateral
could be "saved" in the first period by accepting so~e rationing in order to
reduce the probability of rationing in the second period. Intuitively.
however, it is easy to see thet acceptíng some rationing at t-0 in order to
reduce the likelihood of rationing at tzl ís not opti~al. Th1s is because
rationing at t-0 affects all good types -- including future types -- while]6
ration3ng at t-I affects only the initia] good types who end up in the good
type node of the set of nodes III. We shall later present a forsal proof of
this clai~. For now, we state and solve the representative bank's constrainPd
~axi~ization proble~ assu~ing that ratíoning at t~0 is suboptisal. We
initially examine credit warket eauil7briun where we onlv allow for sinele
period contracts. That is, lntertewporal subsidies are introduced only later.
This ~eans that bank i earns zero expected profit on y~(KI1vK1 and on y2(zlvz.
Thís is a stronger requirement than the zero profit condition stated in the
definition of DSIC`C policies. We retain al] the requirements of the DRE. The
DRE allocations are always fully separating. By looking at Figure 1. one sees
that in each of the sets of nodes I, III and IV, the bank offers two separating
contracts.18 These. observations are useful in the formulation of th~
naximization program of the representative bank.
C. The Maximization Proeram ISinele Period Contractinp in the Two Period
Game):
Given Theorem 1, we know that the DRE allocations can be obtained by
solving for the Pareto dominant DSI`C credit policy. Henceforth, we shall deal
with a representative bank and drop the superscript denoting a specific bank.
When the bank Is restricted to earn zero expected profit in each period, the
problem í s as follows. (The subscript j below is used to number contract nodes
in Figure 1).17




i t L for j~fI
i i H for j-V
(71
subject to
tijlóL~àL) ? l;jlóH~dL). j-1,IlI and IV 12)
C.(óH)6H1 ? t;.(óI'IéH), j-I,III and IV (31
J J
óia~ -[1-ói]~C~ - r, iE{H.L} and j-I,II,---,V l4)
C~ E[O,W~]. i E{H,L}, j-I,1I and IV
CIII E [O,WC-CÍJ, i E {H.L} ~ (5)
C~ E [O,W~-CÍ] ~
a~ ? 0, i E{H,L} and j-1,II,---,V 16)
n~ E[0,1], i E{H,L} and j-I,II.---.V. 17)
In this saximization program. ~j(á~~dk) is the total expected utility of a
borrower which finds itself in the set of contract nodes j, has a success
probabi]ity over the next period of dk IkE{H,L}), and reports its success
probabílity to be di (1E{H.L}). AL and AH are the expected utilities over the
two-period contracting horizon of those borrowers who are initially bad and
good respectívely. These terns are defined in detai] in Table 1. ~ote that
(2) and (3) are incentive compatibility constraints, (4) is the period-bY-
e p riod zero profit constraint for the bank, and (5), (6) and (7) are
feasibility restrictions (íncludine resource constraínts). Constraint (5)
werely ~akes precise our earller stated assuoptíon that the upper bound on C~
can be binding in the good type nodes of the set of nodes III and V. We have
used the assusption here that rationing at t30 is inefficient, i.e., n~-rrÍ-1 is
assumed for now.TABLE I: DEFINITI01~ OF TERMS
L L ~I. H H H
AL ~ (óL[R-aI] - I1-dL]CI . 6-((I'fi]nIVIdH[R-aIV] - (1-dH)CIV)
' ftTriV{dL(R-aÍV] - I1-dL]CIV]] ' (I-dLln~(dL(R-c~] - I1-dL)C~J}
AH g {dH(R~H] - (1-6H]CI ' dHrrÍl(óH(R-aÍI] - II-dH]CII]
~ [1-dH]((1-v]trHII{dH[R~IlI] - (1-dH]CIII}}MIII{ê[R-ctIII]
- (1-dL)CIII}7}.
Ulló~dL) ~ ó(R-aI) - (I-dL]CI ' ó(( I-l1]TiIV{óH(R-aÍV) - ( I-dH]CIV}
' k nIV{6L[R-aÍV] - (1-dL1CiVi] ' II-dL]n`IóL(R-a~] - I1-dL]C~]
U ( 6H 1 6L ) - óL ( R-aH ] - ( 1-óL ] CH dLtrH { ( ( I -~] óH ' fióL ] ( R~zH ] - ( 1 - ( I -~t] dH-~tóL J CH } I I 1' II 11 II
.(]-éL]nIIItdL(R-aIII] - (I-óL]CIIIJ
Uj(dLIóL] - tt~(dL[R-a~] -[1-dL]C~), for j-III. IV and V
UjIóHIdLI z n~[dL(R-aj) -(1-dL)CH], for jzI]I and IV
UIIdHIdHI ~ óH[R-a~J - (1-dH]CI ' dHnII(dH(R~ÍI) - I1-dH]CII]
~[1-dH]((I-v]nIll{6H(R-aHII] - (7-dH1CIII) ~ ~111JdL(R-aIlI]
- (I-dL]CIII])
UI(óL~dH) ~ dH(R-a[i] - [I-dH)CÍ f dHnÍVidH[R-aÍV] - (1-dH]CIVJ
~[1-dH]n~s((1-v]dH - vdLJ(R-a`] - (1-(1-v)dH - vdL]C~}
U-fdHldH) ~ nH(óH(R~H] -[1-êH]CH], for j~II, III and IV J ) J J
Uj1óLIóH) - rrj[dH(R~c~] -[I-dHJcj], for jzIII and IV18
Individua] rationality constraints are superfluous becauae we assuae that these
constraints are slack in equilibriu~ (all borrowers enjoy strlctly positive NPV's net
of borrowing costs and there are no alternatives to bank loans).19
D. Solution Procedure
(i) General Remarks:
Pinding the solution to this constrained optieization progras directly ís rather
cowplicated. However, two observatíons lead to welcome analytical simplifications.
The first si~p]lfication is that we can solve directly for the optimal contracts in
the sets of nodes II and V. By looking at the bank's zero profit conditions and the
objective function (1), one directly concludes that for any ~ E[0,]), it is in the
borrower's interest to choose ("-"'s indicate optimal values in this solution).
CÍI - C~ - 0 18)'
and
"H "L
nII t nV - 1
which implies that.
aÍI - riSH and c~ - r~óL.
18)"
(8)...
The intuition for the results (8)' through (8)"' is clear. In the set of nodes II,
only good types exist. This is common know]edge~, so they should be offered a first
best contract. The same ís true for the set of nodes V. There only bad types exist,
and they should also be awarded a first best contract.
The second sísplifícation ís technícal in nature. Me will take advantage of the
fact that one can solve the model in three stages, with the backward induction of
dynamic prograaming. The first stage consists of deterwining the optimal second
period contracts. The opti~nal second period contracts will be determined under the
assumption that the bank was able to establísh self-selection by contract choice in
the first period. Hence, the bank knows the set of nodes a specific borrowPr belongs]9
to in the second period. Subsequentll~. in the second stage. we will solve for the
optimal first period contracts. taking the second period contracts as given Given
the earlier assuoption that coliateral will be unconstrained in the first period fsuch
that. al] possible shurtages wil] occur in thP second period), this orocedure is
conpletely Eeneral. Finally, tn the thtrd stage, we will show that the íntertemporal
use of collateral that was assumed indeed represents the optisal policy with respPCt
to the use of collateral.
It is easy to sec why this approach is completely general (except for the
assumption about the allocation of collaterall. Apart from co:lateral. the fir~'
period contracts do not restrict the second period contracts. Hence, these lattcr
contracts should be optimized independentl~~. If the bank does not do this, ar~o~iier
bank in the competiti~~e crrdit market can offer the borrowers utility-m:a~imizin;l
contracts in the second period. ~ote that this is feasible because an~~ interac.io;;
between a bnrruwer and an indi~~idual bank immediately becomes commun knou.ed;~e
(iil Stage 1: The Optimal Second Periud Contracts
In this stage we wi]] determinr~ the optimal second periud contracts undf.r t`re~
assump;ion that perfect self-selection was established in the fic-st period. Hence. we
can successive~)y solve for all the contracts in the sets of nodes II through ~'.






Ib) Contracts III: In stage 2, it will be apparent that borrowers ending uI~ in
these nodes have lost collateral in the first period. Given our assumption regardicr~
the availability of collateral, it fo]]ows that co]]atera] is limited to W in thc set
of nodes III. Therefore, we have to determinezo
i i i
{aIII' CIII' nIII)~
for iaL and H, taking into account soee binding constraint on
collateral. This problee is identical to B-T (1987), Propositíon 3. The solution is
(see B-T (1987) for a proof)
aII1 ` r~óL.




nIII - {óL[R-aIII]}{dL[R-aIII] -
6LW)-I,
where dH - I-dH. dL a 1-óL, W e WC - CÍ.
Crote that W is the available collateral ín the second períod if C~ has been
lost in the first period. These results are in líne wíth the eotivating remarks in
Subsection B. A bank which has to sort observationally indístinguishable borrowers is
able to reward good borrowers with lower interest rates (without inducing bad
borrowers to claim to be good), only if the good borrowers are wílling to offer the
necessary amount of collateral. The reason for this is that the expected cost of
collateral is lower for the good borrowers than for the bad borrowers, simply because
the former are less likely to end up in the default state ín which they relinquish
collateral. linfortunate]y, the availability of collateral is constrained in these
nodes. This sakes the contract for good borrowers still attractive to the (mimickingl
bad borrowers. Therefore, the bank needs to make the credit granting probability in
the good borrower's contract smaller than one (nHII~lI, in order to discourage thP bad
borrowers froa sieicking.
(c) Contracts IV: Borrowers enter these nodes without having lost any
collateral. Therefore, the collateral constraint is not binding. The problem is
identical to B-T (1987), Proposition 2. The solution is (see B-T (]987~ for a proof)
aÍV - rióL; CÍV - 0: rrÍV - I
"H H -1 H " H H -1 "H H-L L-H -I "H
aIV - r[è ] - ó gCIV[ó l: CIV - {ór}(ó d -gd é} : nl~,21
where d- dH - óI'. The i ntuition underlying these results is siailar to that for
contracts III. Now collateral avaílabílity is not constraíned. Hence, separating
contracts can be offered without rationing.




This comp]etes Stage 1. The results should be substitutPd in the maximization
program (1) through l7). Then, one can solve for the optinal first period contracts.
That is Stage 2.
(iii) Stage 2: The Optima] First Period Contracts:
In the process of finding the optimal first period contracts. we will use the
following definitions (in which we will also substitute the opti~na] second period
contracts
implying
as determined in Stage 1)
QL -H H "H H~H -L L ~L L'i.
- (1-fc]rIV{d [R-al,,j - d CIV} . }t nIV(d [R-aIV] - d CI`,}.
QL - ~dLóH]-1} . ~ dLR` 19) - (1-,u}{6HR; - [1-~]dH6r[dkdL
QLL - n`{dL[k-ac~] - 6LC~) - óLR~
THHz nÍI{dH(R ~xÍI]-d'HCII) - dHRK
TH a[1-v){óLR`[dLR` ~ dLóHSw[dH]-1 - áLw)-1[dHR~ -[1-(3]dHN]}
T ydLRn
where Rn e R-r[dH] 1 and Rn - R-r[óL)-I are the returns net of repay~nent
obligatíons to the good and bad borrowers respectively in thelr first best




Substitution of the expressions QL QI.L THH and TH in the naximization program
specified in (1) through (7) leads to the followíng simplified progra~n (againz2
we substitute where possible the optimal second period contractsl
Maximize T- Y[dL(R-aÍ] -
óLCÍ . óLQL T óLQLL]
i i H H H H H HH H H





l;l(dL~dL) - dL[R~ci] -
óLC1Lf óLQL t 6LQLL
L:11dHIdL) - dL[R~tÍ] -[1-óL]CH - óL{[1-{~]dH - JcdL}R; - dLdLR;
[:1(óH~dH) ~ L'l1dL~dH)
where,
l:l(dH~dH) - dH(R~ÍJ -
àHCI ` dHTHH ~ óHTH
l:lldl"~óH) - dH(R-ai] - dHC~ - dH{dHR; -[1-g]dHdr{dHÓL - SdLéH)-1}
- dH([]-v]óH - vóL}Rn




0~ Cj ~ WQ. i E(H,L) 1:,1'
o:Í ? 0, i E {H,L}. ts)"
We shal] formulate the Lagrangian by taking into account only constraint (21'
in addition to the objective function (7)'. The constraint (4)' will be
rewritten as aÍ - [rlói]-{[1-di]gCÍ~di), for 1E{H,L}, and wi]] be substituted
directly in the Lagrangian. Froe the solution, it will be easy to check that
(6)' is slack. We wil] also show that (3)' is slack. Furthernore, (5}' will
be recognízed explicitly, once we analyze the fírst order conditions. This
leads to the following Lagrangian
L L -L L L L-{, LL H H H H H HH H H
P- Y[ó Rn - (]-~]d C1 ~ ó Q-d Q )- []-Y](d Rn-[]-g)d CI ~ d T ~ á T]
' a[óLRn-I]-~]óLCÍ~óLQL-óLQLL
. {dLRH-[óHdL-BdLdH)CH[dH]-] ~ óL[{l-k}dH-fedL]RH - dLdLRL)]
b I ` ~23
Differentiating the Lagrangian with respect [o CÍ gives.
~,éCÍ - -[l-Y][1-6)dH - adL-dH9[dH]-1 , adL - 0.
The equality should hold for a solution satisfying 0~ CI ~WO'
Rearranging the first order conditíon gives,
a ~ [1-Y][1-~)dH{3L - 6L6HB[dH]-1)-1 ~ 0.
This isplies that for any i nteríor solution for CÍ, the constraint (2)' is
binding. Hence, we have the following result
t-11dLIóL1 - l'116H~dL1.
Differentiating the Lagrangian with respect to CÍ gives.
d7' aCÍ - -Y(1-6]6L-a(1-6]dL ~ 0.
;h:is directly implies that.
CÍ-O.
(731
We now solve (13) for CH b~~ using 114). the definitions under 12!' and thoso
given in ( 9) through 1121. This yields
CH - D1{dHdL - 6LóHd)-1dH
wtu ch implies
CÍ - D2{óHóL - dl'dH~) lr ~ 0. I151
where
Dl e r - 6LQL - dLQLL - dLr(óH] 1- dLdLR` - dL[{1-{.c}dH-ftd'L]R`
D2 ? d- FedLd r [1-fc]óHdL([1-6]dHd}{óH6L - SdLóH}-1
Since CÍ i s positive and finite, there exists a WD such that CÍ is an interior
solution. The optíe~al values aÍ and aÍ fol7ow directly from ( 4)', (14) and
(I51-
~ext. we wi]] provP that the solution does not violate (31'. `ote that,
from ( 4)', (141 and I151 we have
qÍ - r(dH)-1 - dH~CÍ{dH} 1 and aÍ - r(dL]-124
Now, substituting these results in the definitions of l;I(6H~dH) and ~IfóL~dH),
and using (11) and (121, we obtain
l;I(óH~dH)zdHRN - I1-6]dHCi ' dHdHRN
.dH[{1-V)dLRn{dHRh - (1-~]d~}D3]~ vdLRn]
UI(óL16H)-dHRN ~ dH[ëHRN - [1-9]dHdr{dHdL - dLóH6)-1]





zd{dL)-]r - [1-6]dHCl - {dH[1-91[1-dH)dr}{dHdL-6dLóH}-1
~[1-óH][1-v]D3I[dLRnldHRn - [1-f3]dHK} - óHRn].
The above expression is strictly positíve because
ó[dL] ir - [1-~]óHCÍ - {dH[1-~ldHdr}{dH6L-gdLdH}-1
ó[dI.]-lr
- (1-S]d (1-èL]6r{dHÓL - ~dLdHj-] , {dH[1-g]àHdr){dHdL - 9dLdH}
ó[dL] ir - [I-~]dHdr{ëHdL
- ~dL6H}-1
d2r{dH6L - ~dLëH)-1 i 0.
Thus, we have proved that constraint (3)' is not binding ín the optinal
solution.
(ív) The Non-optimality of Rationing at t-0:
Thus far we have assumed that ít is optimal to use collateral in the
first period as if it is unconstrained and accept all collateral ahortages --2s
with the attendant rationing -- in the second period. we wiil now establish
this as the optiwal strategy.
Once rationing is perwitted at t-0, we need to be speclfic about the
inforwation the bank has about borrowers which were ratloned at t:0 and which
try to enter the credit warket again at tzi. Ne know that rationing only
occurs in the separating contract for the good borrowers. Hence, the credit
warket knows that the borrowers rationed at t-0 are good borrowers for sure at
t-0. But what is their type at t-1? As we have seen already, the non-rationed
borrowers can be either good or bad at t-]. However, for the rationed
borrowers the bank does not observe any first period returns (because these
borrowers do not im.estl. Hence, the bank can not allocate the rationed t-0
borrowers ovrr Lhe sets of nodes II and III, and offer them all sorting
contracts. But sortiny, contracts ínvolves dissipative costs. hon-rationed
borrowers do not get a sortíng contract in the set of nodes II. This effect
tends to make the second period contracts for those who were rationed at t-0
and are good types at t-1 worse than the contracts for those who were not
rationed at t-0 and are good types at t-1. On the other hand, borrowers
rationed at t-0 did not lose any collateral in the first period. So. their
collateral is unconstrained in the second period, implying that their second
period sorting contracts do not ínvolve rationing. This effect wakes the
second period contracts for porrowers who were rationed at t-0 and are good
types at tal sliQhtly better than the contracts for non-rattoned good
borrowers. Cnfortunately. both effects work ín opposite directions. Hence, no
unambiguous welfare íwplícations of ratíoning are possible. This does not
alter nur result about the suboptimality of rationing at t-0, but it
substantially complicates the proof. We, therefore, wake the following
simplifying assumption.26
Assumptiun: Borrowers who are rationed at t-0 wi]] not abandon their two
period projects but will co~~ence invest~ent nt t-1. However. due to
strategic product earket interactions, this delay in investeent wi]] cause a
decay ín the profitabilíty of the project relatíve to the projects of those
borrowers which coewenced investnent at tLO. The decay in profitability
guarantees that the expected second period utility of the investeents
undertaken by borrowers rationed at t-0 does not exceed the expected second
period utility of investments undertaken by those good borrowers whích were
not rationed at t-0.
The purpose of this restriction is to ensure that rationing does not benefit
any borrower. Formally, this leads to the following restriction on the deca}~
parameter p. 0 ~ p 5], where pR is the return on a successtu] project net of
decay. The decay parameter is such that.
I:t-11R) ~ tit-11~)
wt~ere, l;t-11R) - expected second period utility of a borrower which is
at t-1, reported itself to be good at t-0 and was
rationed at t-0;
~t-1(~) " expected second period utility of a borrower which is
at t-1, reported itself to be good at t-0 and was not
ratíoned at t-0.
t;pon substitution of the appropriate expressions (see Figure 1, and the
definitions given earlier). this becomes.z~
[]-Y~](6HRnlp) - I1-BIdHCH) ' `ydLRn(p)
~ [óNj2Rn ~ dH{[1-v]nItI{6HRn - [1-B)dHCIII) ` vdLRn}
where Rn(p) ~ pR - r[61]-1 for iE{H.L}
W a dHv - probabillty that a borrower which is rationed at t-0 is a bad
borrower !n the second period
CH -]eve] of collateral needed for an optimally collateralized (no
rationing) single period contract ín the second period (note
that CH - CÍ~, because contract IV is also optimally
collateralizedl.
Rewriting the inequality above gives
p 5 M
where
M-([dH]ZR` T dHl[1-v]nIII[dHR` - il-S)dHCHIIJ - vdLR`)-r
-(1-~Y](]-g]dHCH){R[{1-W)dH - ~YdL)) ].
It is possible for M to exceed unity. Thus, we must impose the following
parametric restriction on p,
p ~ M ~ 1.
where "~" is the "min" operator. For ]ater use, define
~ - [dHóL - ~dLóH][dH]-1 ~ - [dó - vdLó
][dH]-1
We now have the following result.
LE!LMA 1: Given the assumed restrSction on collateral availability that
CI ~ WO ~ CI ' CIII(opt), where CÍII(opt) is the leve] of collateral necessary
for an optimally collateralized contract, and the restriction that p 5 M n 1.
rationing a borrower at t-0 is always Snferior to rationing at t-]. Hence.28
coJlateral is most efficiently use.d at t~0 and should never be "saved" for
later use if doing so causes rationing at tz0.
One implication of this lemma ís that ín e dynamic credít market. if
rationing occurs it is more likely to affect a borrower which has borrowed and
defaulted rather than one which is borrowing de novo. This is a potentially
testabie prediction.
(v) Eguilibrium With Single Period Contracting:
fie now gather all of the results obtained thus far and present the
complete equilibrium solution.
THEOREM 2: Assuming ttiat
(l) each bank is constrained to earn zero expected profit in each pPriud.
(2) collateral availability is limited in tlie sense that
CÍ ~ KD ~ CI " CIII(opt1. and
(3) p 5 M A 1
the DRE, if it exists. is given by
aIH- r[dH)-1-óH~CÍ[óH) 1.
CI - [ó . ~Ld r {1-~}6L[1-~]óHd~-l~r[~dH~-1
nÍ ~ ],
aÍ - r~6L. CÍ - 0. ni ~ 1;
aÍI - rldH, CÍI - o, nII ~ 1:
aHII - r[dH~-1 - óHBCI1I[dH~-1' CIII - w'
nIII - {dL[R-aIII)}{dL[R-aII1~-[1-óL~w?-129
aIII ` r~óE. CIII - 0. nIIi S 1:
~H H -1 H - H H -1 -H H -1 "H aI~ - r[ó ] - d~CI~(ó ]. CI~ z dr[~ó ], nt~ - l:
aÍy ~ r(óL] 1.CTy : 0. nÍ~ ~]:
a~ L r[éL]-1. C~ ~ 0, n~ a 1.
This theore~ points out two sources of welfare losses for good borrowers
in the DRF, restricted to spot contracting. One source is the dissipative cost
associated with the collateral good borrowers put up in the contract nodes I
and I11. and the other is the possible rationing in contract node ]I1. We show
in the next section how intertemporal contracting helps to reduce welCare
losses,
IV. DkE WITH ItiTERTEyPORAL C0ITRACTI~G
A. Introduction and Basic Results
With intertrmporal contracting, a bank need not aake zero expected profit
on a given borrower ín each time period. It can tax the borrower i n one period
ar:d subsidize it in the next. Of coursP, our competitive equi]ibrium concept
imposes a restriction on allowable tax-subsidy scherAes. The restriction is
that the bank will not subsidize a borrower's first period contract with the
intention of recoupíng the loss through a positive expected profit contract on
that borrower in the second period. The reason is that, after the first
period, the borrower has an íncentive to switch to another bank ín the spot
credit ~arket, leaving the original bank with a loss. Thus, the only feasible
subsidy is on Lhe second pertod contract. Irote also that the DRE precludes
cross-sr.ctional taxes and subsidies, i.e., positive profíts for the bank on one
borrower and negatíve profits on another.30
We shall see in this section that peraitting interte~poral contracting
significantly alters the DRE characterized in Theorea 2. One of the contract
variables that changes is CH. Since rationing occurs with single period
contracting for all WOE[CÍ. CÍ }
CHIIIopt)), we need to show that there exists
a compact subset [a,bJ of [CÍ, CÍ {
CÍlllopt)) such that, for all WOE[a,bJ,
rationing occurs ín the DRE with sinYle period contracting but not in the DRE
with intertempora] contracting. The following technica] result helps in
establishing the desired result.
LEP4~tA 2: For all CHII E[0. CÍII(optl]. we have
{dHRn - []-sJóHCHlI)~óLR~ ~CH11)-1
~ dH[dLJ-] 1]61
With this lemma, we can now establish one of our main results. We will
use tildes to denute equilibrium values.
THEOREM 3: Suppose the DRE with i ntertemporal credit contracting exists and
involves WO E(CH, CÍ -
CNII(opt)), where CÍ is the optima] first period us~ of
collateral for a given WO and a non-binding first period collateral constraint.
Then, a sufficient condition for no credit rationing to occur in the DRE at an~~
time is
v 5 ~. (17)
This theore~ can be interpreted as follows. Assuming a nonempty
intersection for the feasible sets to which WO belongs in Theorems 2 and 3.
intertemporal contracting eliminates rationing for those values of WO lying in
the íntersection. We will prove later that this intersectíon is nonempty.31
To see the intuition behind this theorew, one needs to study its proof.
It is apparent frow the proof that rationing Ss avoided by iwproving the
borrower's expected utilíty -- relatlve to that in the single period
contracting DRE -- in each of the pair of contracts in contract node lll. The
contract for the good borrower is iwproved by an increase ín the credit
granting probability. To preserve incentive cowpatibility, the bad borrower's
contract needs to be iwproved too. However, this adversely affects incenCive
conpatibility at t-0 because borrowers which are bad at tz0 now find it eore
attractive to wiwick the good borrowers at t-0. The reason is that these
borrowers are the ones wore ]ikely to end up at t-1 as borrowers chousing the
contract for bad borrowers in contracts node III. This incentive compatibílity
problem is resolved by increasing collateral requirements at t-0 for borrowers
reporting themselves as good. hote that 1-~ can be interpreted as a
"standardized" weasure of thr costs of resolving the incentive compatibility
problem. On the other hand, 1-v -- the fraction of good borrowers among all
óorrowers offered contracts node III at t-] -- way be interpreted as a
"standardized" weasure of the incremental revenues attributable to the
elinination of rationing. A large 1-v indicates that, when rationing is
eliwinated, a relatívely large proportion of the borrower pool is positively
affected. Thus. (17) can be viewed as a"cost-revenue" condition.
Henceforth, the conditions stated in Theorew 3 will be assuwed to be
satisfied. Consequently, the credit granting probability as a sorting
instruwent is rendered superfluous. One only needs to deal with Snterest rates
and collateral requirewents ns sorting instruwents. It is fortuitous that
these varíables enier the wodel línearly, since we can derive the equilibriuw
allocations by using ]ínear programming (LP) techniques.32
B. Mode] Specífication and the DRE
(í) General Renarks:
The following observations help to significantly si~plífy the ~odel.
Intertesporal contracts enable the banks to offer bad borrowers at ts0 a ftrst
best contract over their entire two period ti~e horizon. In the single period
contractíng DRE described in Theore~ 2, bad borrowers at tz0 do not get a first
best contract over their entire tiee horizon. This is because they can end up
ín the coniract IV nodes where separating contracts are offered. The contract
for good borrowers in this set involves costly collateral, waking the contract
worse than first best. However, intertemporal contracting enables the bad
borrower at t-0 to pay a higher first period interest rate in exchange for a
contract that is first best for those borrowers who are Yood among all
borrowers ending up in the contract IV nodes. Even if an initially bad
borrower ends up being bad at t~l, it has paid in ihe first period for this
gain. This construction obviates the need for separating contracts in the
contract IV nodes and elininates collateral costs there, ensuring that
borrowers which are bad at t-0 never put up any collateral- Incentive
compatibility is not a concern here. This way the bad borrowers at t~0 can be
given a contract which yields then an average, per period expected utility
equa] to first best. Furthermore, the contract cannot be ~ade better than
first best because this would i~ply losses to the bank. forcing it to earn
positive profit on the contract for good borrowers at t-0. This is not
possible in the DRE. These observations allow us to focus exclusively on the
Sntertemporal contracts for good borrowers at t-0. as long as we take into
account the first períod incentive compatabilíty constraint that bad borrowers
at t-0 prefer their own (fírst best) contract to the contract for good33
borrowers at ~:0. we can now obtain the DRE by aearching for the allocation
that ~axisizes the two period expected utility of the Dorrower which is good at
t-0. subject to the relevant constraints. Given the linearity of the ~odel,
this is the sase es ~axisizing the negatlve of the borrowing costs of the good
borrower at t-0 over íts two period ti~e horizon. W1th the help of Fígure i,
we see that this isplies the fol]owing objective function.
Maximize i - -óHa~-d
CÍ - dH6HaÍI-6H[1-v][óHaIII~dHCHII~ (l81
{aH.CH.aN]'ayll'CIII'a1I1} -dHvóLaIII
We maximize (18) subject to the following constraints.
(A) `on-neQativity constraint on the bank's profits: The costs for the bank
of lending to a borrower which is good at t-0 is r in each period. Hence.
the total expected intertemporal interest and collateral receipts for the
bank should not be less than 2r. That is.
H H H H H H H H H H H H H L L ó aI - 6 pCI - á 6 aII-ó [1-vl[ó aIII - d ~CII1~ - d vó aIII ~ 2r (191
(BI Constraints on second period contracts: Since the bank can tax only first
period contracts. in terms of interest rates and collateral. the following
restrictions apply.
dHaIII ~ r
H H H H






(C) Incentive cospatibility constraint for the contracts II1 nodes: Here we
assume that it is always optima] to use a]] avai]able co]]ateral in the
contract for good borrowers in the contracts node III. In a subsequent
]e~ma, we will fornally prove this. The incentive coepatibility34
condltíons are. ~III(dHlóH) - ~III(óL~óH) ? 0,
which í~plies the following constraints
H H H H H L
-ó aIII -~ CIII ~ ó aIII ~ 0
and. UIII(dL~óL) - ~IIIIóHIóL) ~ 0, which is identical to.
-óLaL ~ óLaH ' óLCH III III III ~ 0'
(23)
124)
(D) Incentive compatibility conditíons for contract I: As usual, the
conditions are. LIIÓL~dL) - CI(óH~óL) ? 0, which implies (note that 2r is
the expected interest cost over two periods for the first best contract
for bad Dorrowers),
óLa~ - óLCÍ ~ óL[(]-~}óH - KóL)aII ' óLóLaIII ~ 2r 1251
and CI(óH~óHl-L-I(óL~óH) ? 0. This latter condition is s]ack as usual.
But we shall formally verify this.
We wil] solve the model subject to the constraints (l9). (2]). (24) and 125)
Subsequently. we will show that the other constraints are slack. As in the
single period contract solution, the individual rationality constraints for
borrowers are superfluous.
The assumption that W~ E[CÍ. Cj-CÍII(opt)) ímplies 0 ~ CHII ~ CIII(opt).
Froe earlier analysis, we know that
D ~ CIII ~ ór[~óH]-1.
Without loss of generality we can rewrite thís as
CHII ` 9ór[móH~-1 e E [0.11.
CIII(opt) ' ór[~óH]-1. Thus.
We can now present the ~aín result of this section.
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THEOREM 4: Assume that. as long as 0 5 WD - CH ~ C~II(opt), all available
collateral will be demanded of good borrowers in contracts node III. Then. if35





c`tÍ I - o ;
-H H-1 H -H H-1 H H-1
aIII - r[ó ] - ó BCIII[d ] . CIII - Aór[md ] .
aIII i r[dL]-]-[1-A]dr[dLdH] ].
ai - r[2 - {[dL]Z - dHóL}{dHóL} 7]:
a}i - a'. - r(dH]-7 L ~ r[dL]-]
I~' I ~' ' av
To complete the characterization of the DRE, we need to establish that
the collateral assumption in the above theorem is unnecessary. This is done
now.
LEM~A 3: It is optima] to demand all availab]e collatera] of good borrowers in
the contracts node III as long as0 5 W~ - CÍ ~ CÍII(optl
The intuition is as follows. Denanding less collatera] of good borrowers
in the contracts node III would necessitate a Purther subsidy to bad borrowers
in that node in order to preserve incentive compatibility at t-1. But such a
subsidy causes incentive conpatibility to break down at t-0. The restoration
of incentive compatibility is achieved by demanding higher collateral fro~n
every good borrower at t-0. The benefit Ss a lower collateral requirenent for
a fraction (]-dH][7-v] of al] borrowers which are good at t-0. However, the
dissipation due to an increase in collateral requirements for all good36
borrowers at t~0 turns out to be greater than the gain due to a reduction ín
collateral requirenents at t-] for a fraction of these borrowers. This is
inefficient unless íncreasing collateral at t-0 helps reduce ratíoning at t-1.
(A sinilar strategy of increasing the good borrower's collateral require~ent at
t-0 is part of the DRE (see Theoreo 4) since it e1l~inates ratíonfng ín the
contract III nodes. This is optí~al because rationing ís ~ore dissipative than
collateral.) But ín this case, our startíng point is that there ís no
rationing at t-0. Given this, it does not pay to shift collatera] use from t-1
to ts0.
V. COMPARISO~ OF SIIGLE PERIOD COKTRACTI~G DRE WITH I~TERTEMPORAI.
CO~TRACTIIvG DRE
Before we can conclude that intertempora] contracting i ndeed eliminates
the rationing encountered with single period contracttng. we need to verlfy
that the collateral availability assumption made in Theorems 2 and 9 are
compatible. This i s done below.
LE!PtA 4: For ~ set of parameter va]ues, 3 some positive and finite WO such
that the collateral assuwptions in Theorems 2 and 4 are sioultaneously wet.
Expressed i n ter~s of exogenous parameters, choices of WO that achieve this
cospatibility satisfy
[W~, Wp) if FtóL-[1-9)óHÓL[1-KJ~-1 ~ E
WO E
[W~. W~) if ftóLr[1-6ldHóL(1-k)~-1 5 E
(27)
where W~ - Ir(móHJ-1(1 - k6L - (7-~)óHóL(1-f.c)~-1)
WÓ - 6r(~óRJ-1[1.~)37
Np - 2ár(Q7óHj-1
tiith this lemma in hand, we can compare the two DRE's. The major result
ís that intertemporal contracting elíminates the rationing ihat occurs in the
contract III nodes. Since these nodes fol]ow first period project failure, the
implication is that credit rationing, if it occurs, is likely to be encountered
after borrower defau]t. This seems consistent with casual empiricism.
Comparing Theorems 2 and 4 shows that aIII ~ aIll'
ln fact. with
intertempora] contracting. the contract for bad borrowers in the contract III
nodes is better than the sing]e period first best contract for such borrowers.
The disadcantage of this is that it jeopardizes incentive compatíbilit~ at t-U
The advantage is that there ís an off~etting positive effect, manifested in a
lower collateral requirement now being sufficient to separate borrowers at t-1
fo]]owing project failure. The combined effect is such that rationing is
unnecessary.
A second interesting feature of the DRE with intertemporal contracting is
that successfu] past performance can be rewarded. Tliis reward is striking.
Borrowers which report themselves to be good at t-0 and are successful in tlic~
first period are rewarded with aÍI-0.20 ~otice that asking good borrowers at
t-0 to pay a relatively hiph first period interest rate and then giving them a
"free" second period loan i s incentive compatible. This is because good
borrowers -- more likely to have a successful fírst period realízation -- are
more willing than bad borrowers to pay a higher first period interest rate in
exchange for a free second period loan.
There is. consequently. an ínteresting "carrot and stick" disiinction
between the intertemporal contracting DRE and the single period contracting38
DRE. In the former. revelation Lncentives are positively enforced by offering
rewards to good borrowers who indPed succeed. In the latter, revelation
incentives are enforced by the threat of ex post puníshment (rationing) for
good borrowers that fail.
VI. EXISTEtiCE OF THE DRE
A. Tntroduction and Basic Resulis:
We will now examíne the question of whether a dynamic equilibrium exists.
We will prove the existence of both the single period contracting DRE in
Theorem 2 and the intertemporal contracting DRE in Theorem 4. In the former
case. defecting banks are ]imited to only those contracts that break even in
each period, although not necessarily those that break even on each type within
a period. In the latter casP. defecting banks have unrestricted ]atitude in
their choice of contracts.
As in the case of equilibria in static models. defections that can
threaten the DRE take the form of nonequilibrium pooling contracts being
offered. Since pooling contracts do not sort borrowers, and collatrra] and
rationing are dissipative sorting devices, neither will be used in a pouling
contract. Further, an efficient intertemporal pooling contract wi]] utilize
all observable information. This implies that an intertemporal pooling
contract wi]] specify one interest rate for the first period for all borrowers.
and two interest rates -- one for each first period realizatíon -- for the
second period.21 Thus, it is not optimal to have a contract offered at t-0
that pools completely across tíme and types, offering all borrowers the same
interest rate over both periods regardless of first period performance. we now
introduce the following additional notation,
al - fírst period pooling interest rate.39
0:2 ~ second period pooling interest rate conditiona] on a good first
period realization
a2 - second period poolSng interest rate conditioned on a bad first
period realízation.
The following leema is very usefu] in the proof of existence.
LEt~W 5: Suppose there exists a(separating) Nash equilibriun ln the (single
period) spot market at t-7. Then, if the bank is restricted to earn zero
expected profit ín each period, an optimal pooling contract at t-0 cannot be
completely pooling, in the sense that borrowers with bad first period
realizations will be offered a paír of (separating) contracts at t-1.
The starting point of this lemma is the assumption that it is possiblc~ to
separate borrowers at t-1 and the observation that the optinal pooling contract
can at best be partially pooling since it must distinguish between borrowers in
the second period based on first period outcome. It then goes on to say that.
even amonF the class of such pertia]]y poo]ing contracts, it is inefficient to
have contracts that offer the saae second period loan interest rate to all the
borrowers with bad first period realizations. The lemAa asserts that the
conditions under which thís is true are less restrictive than those needed to
sustain a Nash equilibrium -- which we know is fully separating, from the work
of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) --in the epot aarket at tLl. It is
reasonable to require that a Nash equilibriun (and hence a Riley (1979)
equilibríum) exists in the spot ~arket at t-1, so that borrowers have the
opportunity to avai] of spot credit then as an alternative to utilizing ]ong
term commitments.40
This ]emma is intuitive. The existence of a separating ~ash equiliDrium
in the spot sarket at t-1 depends on how attractíve the pooling al]ocation is
to the good borrowers. The pooling a]]ocation reflects the relative proportion
of good and bad borrowers in the population. In the leema, the pool in
question consists of all borrowers with bad first period outcoees. Thus. the
proportion of bad borrowers in this pool is high. This i~plies that the
pooling contract has an interest rate closer to the first best interest rate
for bad borrowers than that for good borrowers. It ís, therefore, unappealing
to good borroNerti. creating the impetus for competing banks to offer contracts
that sort borrowers. This lemma rests on the assumption that the bank is
constrained to earn zero expected profit in each period. We will next
introduce the possibi:it~~ of intertemporal subsidies.
B. The ODtima] Poolin~ Contract:
The pre~~ious lemma indicates that, with a period-by-period zero profit
constraint. the optimal intertempora] pooling contract is likel~~ to im-olve a
pooling interest rate al for al1 borro~ers in the first pPriod, a pooling
interest rate a2 in the second period for al] borrowers with good first period
realizations, and a pair of separating contracts in the second period for
borrowers with bad first periocf realizations. We wi]] establish formall}~ that,
even with intertemporal subsidies allowed, the optimal po.oling contract indeed
takes this form as ]ong as collateral is not "too costly."
The pair of separating contracts for borrowers with bad first period
realizations involves a secured ]oan contract, {ocB. CB}, specifying an interest
factor and a collateral requírement, and an unsecured loan contract, {~}. The




































Fi~ure Z- The relevant data in the pooLinR contract alternative.4l
in the first period, and the latter will be taken by the bad borrowers frow
that pool. From Figure 1. we now have Fieure 2.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
In the waxiaization problea~ below, we take advantage of the wel]-known
result that ~axi~izing the weighted sum of the expected utílities of the good
and bad borrowers ís equivalent to ~axiwizing the utility of the good borrower
subject to the constraint that the bad borrower gei its first best utility (see
Spence I]978), for example). t;sing Figure 2, we get the following objective
function.
Maximize 7--dHa] - óHdHa2 - 6[1-v][dHoB - óCHJ - 6vóLaB (281
{a1.a2.ocB.CB.o~}
This objective function should be n~aximized subject to the fo]]owing
constraints.
lai ThP non-negatívitv condition for the bank's profits: The cost of ]ending
to a borrower is r in both periods. Hence, the toial expected interest and
collateral receipts for the bank should be at least equa] 2r per borrower.
({1-Y)dH ~ YdL]a1 - [fl-Y}óHdH - YdL{1-fc)6H ~ YóL~ióL]a2
- (1-Y]óH[1-v][dHo~ - dH~CBJ t [(1-Y]óHv ~ YóL]ófatB ? 2r. (29)
(b) The feaslbílity constraint for the bad borrower's intertemporal utility:
In the ( separating) interteaporal solution, bad borrowers get a
contract over their two period horízon that generates an average
expected utility per period that i s equal to first best. That is,
their expected total interest costs are 2r. Futher~ore, in equílíbrium
good borrowers at t-0 do not covei the contract of bad borrowers. This
i~plies that any feasible pooling contract ~ust offer bad borrowers at
t-0 a contract that yields them at least a first level of expected42
uttlity over the two perlods. That Is.
dLai - db[(1-k)éH ~ fcéL]cc2 ~(1-dL)óhoB ~ 2r
(c) Spot ~arket constraints on aecond períod contracts: The aecond períod
pooling interest factor for the pool of borrowers successfu] in the
first period is bounded above by the available spot ~arket poolíng
interest factor. Pros Fígure 2, one can infer that the auccess
probability for this pool is
(30)
d0 - TdC ~[]-TJdH, where T a: YdL~c{YÓC t [1-YJdH}-I. Thus.
ó~ - 1[1-YJ(ëH]2 , YóL[1-ft)óH ' Y[óLl2li?{[1-Y)dH t,~,óL)-]
The spot ~arket pooling ínterest rate in the second period is r16~ for this
pool. Ttiis puts the following constraint on the pooling interest
rate aZ (substitute in rló0 the expression for d~l
tt2 c{(1-Y]6H ~ Y6L)r{[1-Y][6HJ2 r Y6I'[1-~.t]dH
i Y[dI'J2~t}-1
With respect to the separaiing contracts for the pool of borrowers
unsuccessful in the first period, the following constraints hold.





(d) Incentive compatibility constraints for the separating contracts for
the poo] of borrowers unsuccessful in the first period: One i ncentive
coapatibility condítion i s t;B(óH~óH) - l:B(óL~óH) ? 0, which implies
-dHacB - dCBHy dLaá ? 0 l34)
and the other i s, 1vB(óLIóL) - UB(dH~óL) ? 0, which iaplies,
-dbo~ - dLo:B r óCB~ 0. (35)
In addition to the constraínts above, all variables are also assu~ed to
be non-negatíve. Since the ~nodel is linear, it can be solved by applying the
si~plex algorithm of linear prograsaing. We will solve the ~odel subject to43
the constraints (29), (30), (32). (33) and (35). The other conditions will be
shown to hold. The solution is presented in the next theores, for which the
following definition Ss useful. Define
F s -[dHv[1-Y] a YóL]óLdH){[1-Y)óH
a,~,óL)-1
. {[óH)2[1-vj[1-~jóE)~-i t óHvóL.
THEOREM 5: The optimal ínterte~poral pooling contract, obtained by ~axi~izing
(28) subject to the constraints (29)-(35), is as follows (bars on endogenous
contract variables denote optímal values here)
(36) If F ~ 0, then
al - {2r){[]-YJóH - Yó~)-1 - {[I-Y]óH - Y6~}r{(I-Y]óH - Yd~)-1.
cL2 - 0:
~- r[óH]-1 - óH~CB[óHj-1 CB - ór[~óH]-I -~L L r[óL])-l.










- {[1-Y]óH - Yó~)ëLr{óH[{1-Y?dH -
YóI"])-I,
This theorem shows that bad borrowers at t~0 are awarded a two period
contract that generates a higher average expected utility per petiod than their
first best contract. Given the bank's breakeven condition, this implies an
expected utility for good borrowers that is lower than first best. It is a
little surprising that the best interte~poral pooling contract is unable to
always produce a first best outcome for all borrowers. It is obvíous that a
pooling contract in a static mode] cannot generate the first best outcon~e for
the good borrowers. However, it might appear that the possibility of rewarding44
successfu] borrowers and punishing unsuccessful borrowers at the end of the
first period wou]d lead to first best a]locations for both types. But this is
not the case. Good borrowers get less than theír fírst best and bad borrowers
~ore than their first best. Moreover. the (partially) pooling solution in (36)
indicates that separating contracts will be used for unsuccessful first period
borrowers. Separation involves collateral with its attendant deadweight
losses. It is easy to show that the solution ín (36) is optimal for all
g E[1-u. ]] for u~0 sufficiently sTa]]. That is, if collateral is relatively
costless -- ~ ís close to 1-- then collateral will be used in the opti~al
pooling contract. The condition g E(]-u. ~] guarantees that F 5 0-- then it
is optinal to not use it. The solution in (37) involves second period
contracts that are unsecured for all borrowers; borrowers successfu] in th~~
first period all receive one second period interest factor and borrowers
unsuccessfu] in ttie first period all receive another second period interest
factor. Thus, there is no separation beyond that possible by observing first
period outcomes, and col]ateral is avoided. This implies that relaxation of
the period-by-period zero profit constraint for the bank enables second period
pouling to be optimal even following first period failure, as long as
collateral is relatively costly.
C. Existence of Eauilíbrium
In examining existence, Me will focus on the pooling contract in 136) as
the ~ain threat. This Ss done for two reasons. First, it ~akes the exposition
parsisonious. Second, except for sose differences in paranetric restrictions.
the pooling contracts in (36) and (37) provide the same insights into the
existence of the DRE. We now have the principal result of this section.45
THEOREM 6: The following conditions are sufficient for the stmultaneous
existence (that is, both equilibria exist for the same set of exogenous
paraweter values) of the síngle period contractíng DRE ln Theorem 2 and the
intertempora] contracting DRE in Theorem 4:
(al SinAle Period Contracting DRE:
- {1-dH(dy]-I)r-[1-g]óC~ - 6 [i-v]J1 ~ [1-g]6dr~-I ? 0,
where JI - dHR; -[1-~JóHór[~ór[~dH]-I - nIIl[óHR; - óH(1-~]W}
á s []-YJáH - YóL
óH[I-R-r{[1-v]óH - vdL}-I 5 nIII[6HR` - [1-9]óW]
d [7-9][móH]-1 c kI{1-~}6H -~cóLJ-1
(b) Intertemporal ContractinA DRE:
(I-óHJr - JZ - J3 - [dH]2[7-v][1-B]Íl-~]dr[~óH]-1
where JZ - óH{-[]-dHJ - Yd]r(6y}-1
J3 - óH[]-á][]-{1-~}~]ór[mdHJ-1
E - {dHdL - vóLdH){dH} ~
vss
F ~ 0







Moreover, the set of exogenous parameter values for which all of the abo~.e
conditions símultaneously hold is nonempty.
This theorem states the joint conditions for the simultaneous existence of
the single period contracting DRE in Theorem 2 and the intertemporal
contracting DRE ín Theorem 4. It guarantees that, under these conditions,
there does not exist any (partially or fully) pooling contract that can upset
the DRE.46
VII. EXTENSIONS AhD EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS
A. Mode] Extensions
Our analysis indicates that borrowers may purchase credit commitments to
insure themselves against future rationing. Are there any borrowers, then.
that would actually get rationed? Although strictly within the context of our
model the answer is no, one can think of a(slight) perturbation of the model
that would produce borrowers which do not purchase commitments in equilibrium,
and hence risk being rationed. Suppose there was a third group of borrowers
which enter the credit market at t-0 but are uncertain of needing any credít at
t-1. That is. these borrowers have some probability. ~ E(0,1). of having a
project available to invest ín at t-1. Such borrowers do not invest in the
second period íf no project ís available. The realization of project
availability is independent of the reali~ation of the borrower's first period
project payoff. Call such a borrower "possibly transitory" (p.s.). Suppose
p.s. borrowers are observationally identica] to all other borrowers at t-0, but
each has a first period success rpobability of 6H. Also, if a p.s. borrowcr
invests in the second period, it is no different from a borrower that was good
at tz0 and had the same first period project payoff as that p.s. borrower.
~ow, Sn an intertemporal contracting DRE, since all borrowers receive contracts
that tax them in the first period and then subsidize them in the second period
for some first period realizatíons, p.s. borrowers will not purchase
intertemporal contracts if ~ is sufficiently small. Rather, they will take
single period contracts similar to that descríbed in Theoren 2. (Of course.
the equilibrium wi]] ]ook different with p.s. borrowers Decause the incentive
compatibility conditíons will change.) For some parameter values, such4~
borrowers wil] get rationed with a nonzero probability at t-1, following first
period project failure.
The nodel can further be extended by having p.s. borrowers being of one of
two types at t~0 and selecting separating síngle period contracts then. In
this case, at t-0 we will have each borrower first deciding whether to purchase
a síngle period contract or an intertesporal contract, and then deciding
whether to report itself as good or bad.
B. Empirical Implications
The following predictions have emerged from our analysis.
(11 Borrowers tt~at purchase credit commiiments are less likely to be rationed
than borrowers that borrow in the spot credit market.
(2) Among the borrowers not purchasing intertemporal contracts, those
borrowers that paid ]ower first period interest rates Ireported their
type as "good") and then defaulted are more likely to be ratíoned than
those borrowers that paid higher first period interest rates (reported
their types as "bad"1 and then defaulted. Alternatively. those who
defaulted on secured loans are more likely to be rationed than thosP who
defaulted on unsecured loans.
(3) Ceteris paribus, credit contracts received by those who have defaulted in
the past are worse than contracts received by those who have repaid in
the past.
14) If rationing exists, it is aore likely to be encountered after observing
a poor performance by the firm for so~e ti~e rather than at the outset.
It should be emphasized that tests of these predictions nust be conducted
with care. As in other asymmetric ínformation ~odels. these predictions apply98
to observationallY identical cohorts of borrowers. If the chosen sample
aggregates observationally distinct groups, it is possible thet differences in
contract teres based on observable dífferences ín borrowers will doninate the
differences induced by incentive co~patibility considerations. Thus, the
sa4ple should be chosen to include only borrowers that are ídentical -- except
in their contract choices -- based on all publicly avaílable information.
VI1I. CONCLl;SIO~
We have analyzed a dynamic eode] of credit narket equilibrium in which
borrowers can choose between spot contracts and long term credit commitments
from banks. Moreover. each credit contract can be a secured or an unsecured
loan. Banks Aay ration credit at any time. In this context, we have shown
that intertemporal credit contracts havc a"memory" feature: future contracts
depend on past repaynent behavior. Moreover, a borrower that does not purchase
a credit commitment and borrows exclusively in the spot markPt may be rationed
in the second period if ít defaults in the first peciod- A borrower can
protect itself aí;ainst rationing by purchasing a commitment from a bank that
guarantees future liquidity. It is quite striking that we obtain this result
despite universa] risk neutrality.
We have also established the existence of a(unique) dynamic equilibrium.
In doing so, we have shown that the nost efficient poo]ing contract does not
pool completely across tí~e and types, í.e., it is only partially pooling under
reasonable conditíons. However, the dynamic equilibriun involves fully
separating contracts. Our analysis differs from earlier dynamic ~nodels of
credit market equilibrium such as Diamond 1198G1 and Spatt 1198f1 in that those
are eodels of borrower reputation and do not involve collateral. Consequentl~-a9
they address very different issues. Our analysís also differs frow Rogerson's
(1985) repeated wora] hazard ~odel which does not consider pre-contract
asy~~etric infor~ation.
The lntuition for~alized !n this paper is that it !s the possibly
widespread occurrence of credit cationing that encouraees the developeent of
forward credit sarkets. We do not claim that ratloning can be co~pletely
eliminated through contractual sechanisms. Rather. we wish to enphasize that
credit contracting innovations. stimulated by rationing, can lessen the
incidence of rationing.S-1
LIS7 OF KEY SYMBOLS
dL ~ the success probability for a bad borrower;
dH - the success probabillty for a good borrower;
nj s the credit granting probability in the set of contracts j for borrower
type i(! E{L. H). j E{I. II. III. IV. V});
aj - the interest factor (- one plus the interest rate) in the set of contracts
j for borrower type 1(i E{L. H}, j E{I, II. III, IV, V});
g z measure of the bank's evaluation of a borrower's collateral. That ís. 57
collateral has a value of S to the bank:
Y(1-Y) ~ the proportion of bad ( good) borrowers at t-0;
ín the set of nodes II:
IV:
V:
~(1-~VI - the proportion of bad ( good) borrowers at t-1 within the pool of
borrowers rationed at t-0:
C~ (1-C11 - the proportion of bad (good) borrowers w~ithin the pool of borrowers
with bad first period realizations:
T(1-T) ~ the proportion of bad (good) borrowers withín the pool of borrowers
with good first period realizations;
a ~ Lagrange multipiier:
p- decay parameter for delayed investment projects:




6 a (1-YJdH ~ Y6L
~ s {6~ [1-dL] - ~dL(1-dHJ)(óH}-1
E s {dH[1-dLJ - vdL[1-dHJ){óH}-]
CÍIllopt) ~[dH - 6LJr(~óH]-1 - the leve] of collatera] in an optimallyS-2
collateralized single period contract:
R- the return on the investeent project if successful;
r~ the risk free interest factor (- one plus the risk free interest rate):
W~ - the initia] (t~0) leve] of available collatera] for each individual
borrower:
W s W~ - CI ~ the available collateral in the second period if
CI has been lost in the first period:
C~ ~ the collateral asked in the set of contracts j from a type i borrower
(i E{L. H}; Y E{I. II. III. IV, V});
Cj(ók~ói) - the expected ability for a type i borrower who chooses the t~~Pe
k contracts, starting from the set of nodes j:
ctl - the first period pooling interest rate:
a2 - the second period pooling interest rate conditioned on a good first
period realization:
ó - 6H - óL
ól - 1- di. i E{H. L}
R; a R - r[ó1J-I. j E{H, I.}
~1 - dynamic strategic credit policy of bank i
`El - first period crPdit policy
`E2(Y~. X~) - second period credit policy applicable to borrower with first
period contract choice y~ and first period realization X1.
~- set of all possible competing banks (there are n banksl
ii e net expected profit of bank i
K1 e borrower's first period type
K2 - borrower's second period type
z-(K1. X1, K2) is borrower's composite type
y2 - borrower's second period contract choice
ï - bank's objective function
~ - LagrangianS-3
a2 ~ the second period pooling interest rate conditíoned on a Dad first period
realizatíon:
In Lemma S it is established that the bad return poo] within an
intertemporal pooling contract gets a separating contact. The fo11ow1ng





second period interest factor for bad types in the pool of
unsuccessful first period borrowers;
second period interest factor Por good types in the poo] of
unsuccessful fLrst period borrowers;
CB - second pPriod collater~l asked froa a good types in the pool of
unsuccessful first period borrowers:
Some additionel symbols:
"" on top of variables índicates the Iseparating) single-period-contract
solution:
-" on top of variables indicates the Iseparating) intertemporal contract
solution:
-" or "~" on top of variables indicetes the (intertemporal) pooling contract
solution.F-1
FOOT`OTES
1) Recently. Stiglitz and Weiss (1987) have explored the ~acroeconomic
iaplications of their rationing ~odels.
2) Thus. Besanko and Thakor's (1987) work ~ay be viewed as a generalízation
of Bester's (1985). Bester shows that unconstrained collateral
availability eliainates the rationing one encounters in Stiglítz and
Weiss (1981).
3) See, for example, Caspbell (7978), Thakor. Hong, and Greenbaue (198]) and
Thakor (1982).
4) These are f]oatinQ rate cosmítwents which involve the bank lending in the
future at a rate that is equal to the prevailing priee rate plus a fixed
add-on or the prevaíling príme times a fixed eultiple.
51 See Thakor, Hong and Greenbaum (1981), for example.
61 There are some recent papers that have provided explanations for loan
comnitment demand by risk neutral borrowers (see. for example. Boot,
Thakor and Cdell (]987a). Thakor (1987), and Kanatas (198711. However.
they do noi explain the role of loan commitments as a guárantee against
future credit rationing.
71 We thus abstract from ex post breach of contract issues. These are
explicitly analy~Pd in Boot. Thakor and t;dell 17987b1.
8) Our view ín this paper is that an important function of intertemporal
credit contracts is the provision of "insurance" against rationinE. ThE~
equilibrium contracts we characterize are a special form of a genera:
intertempora] credit contract, and the loan commitments commonly found in
practice represent another special form. Both guarantee funds
availability.
9) Taken in conjunction with borrower limited liabilíty, this implies that
costless resolutions through payoff-contingent contracts of the
Bhattacharya (7980) typc are infeasible.
10) In fact, in our formal analysis we will assume ~- 0, a- 1, as an
extreme simplificatlon consistent with the assumptions v ~ n and a~~.
11) Tfiis assumption appears to be strong. but it is not. We could simply
assume that the second period investment is so ]arge that even a
successful first period borrower could not completely self-finance. The
second period project return 1n the successful state could then be taken
as aR, where a~ 1 is a sufficíently large number to ensure that the
project has a positive net present value. This will also lead to a mode]
structure in which there is first period failure and it is i~possible to
fund the second period project without a bank loan.
12) Thus. faced with a randomly chosen borrower at t-0, the bank simply takes Y
and ]-Y as the probabílities that the borrower is bad and good,
respectively.
13) See, for example, Myerson (198]).
14) This value dissipation can be thought of as arising from the
(transactionsl costs incurred by the bank in taking possession of and
liquidatinv the collateral put up by a borrower that has defaulted.F-2
15) As Stíglitz and Weiss (1984) poínt out. the "problem" in such games is
usually nonexistence of equi]ibrium in pure strategies. although
existence wíth mixed strategies 1s generally attainable (Dasgupta and
Maskin (]986e, ]986b)).
16) Apart from the fact that this provides us with a way of conceptualizing
an equilibrium that exísts, the recent work of Engers and Fernandez
(]987) has shown that the intuit7ve stability-type críteríon of Cho and
Kreps (1987) justifies the Riley reactive equilibrlum as "reasonable".
Admittedly, the argument does renain somewhat heurístic sSnce the game-
theoretic refínements of Ivash equilibria have formally been applied to
games in which the informed move first, whereas the uninformed move first
in the Riley framework. C;otice, however, that we actually prove that a
~ash equilibrium exists, i.e.. we establish conditions stronger than
those needed for a DRE to exist. This is done for two reasons. First,
despite our choice of the DRE as thr equilibrium concept to USe, we
wanted our equilibrium allocations to be relatively robust with respect
to the equilibrium concept adopted. Second, proving the existence of a
`asli equilibrium is. in this case. more illuminating in terms of the
insights it produces. Our adoption of the DRE in th~ first plare is to
ensure the existence of equilibrium when the model is extended to a
continuum of types.
]7) This may be viewed as a form of subgeme perfection rrquiremPnt. Subgam~-
perfec[ion requires that. startíng from any decision node in an extensive
form representation of the game (whosr. event sequence is in Figure 71
such that the game when restricted [o that and [he succeeding nodes is a
"proper" subgamc, (in the Kreps and wilson (79821 sense~. the contracts and
corresponding sirategies restricted to that subgame constitute a~asli
equilibrium for the suLgame. ~ote that there is nn "prohlem" in applying
this criterion in our context, even though the bank's information set at
the start of the second period may not be a sing]eton, beceuse the bank
always has sufficient information at any point in time to offer a pair of
separating contracts that are incentive compatiblr then, and the bank
(the uninformed agent) moves first.
Engers and Fernandez (]987) show that the reactive equi]ibrium is
subgame perfect in a static setting. We impose condition (b) ín the
definition of equi]iDrium to ensure that subgame pei,fection holds in our
dynamic extension. lrote, however, that this condition ís only meant to
imply that the bank and the borrower will not have an incentive to
renegotia[e the second period contract after the first period. We do not
permit the bank and the borrower to renegotiate the first period contract
after the first period.
18) Because, ~ L 0 and a-]. only one contract is offered in each of the
sets of nodes II and V.
19) hote that the assunption that borrowers have access to no other credit
sources besides bank loans is not restrfctíve. With an alternative
credit source that is not as advantageous to the borrower as a bank loan.
one simply rescales things so that the borrower's u[ility of borrow.ing
from the alternative source is netted out.
201 If interest rates are constrained to be nonnegative (i.e.. o: ? 11. then
the second period interest rate wil] be set at zero. A]though theF-3
details of the DRE will change, its qualitative characteristics will be
unaltered.
2:1 This ~akes it poss:ble to reward~punish first period perforwance.R-1
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